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According to classic finance theories， a better maturity structure of debt 
portfolios could mitigate agency problems， such as optimizing corporate investment 
behavior and restraining controlling shareholders' expropriation. As a result of the 
internal and external governance mechanisms deficiency， an unreasonable debt 
contract arrangement will aggravate agency conflicts. In China， listed companies 
with political connection could easily access to debt financing which will induce 
agency problems. In turn， agency problems adversely affect debt financings which 
increase systematic risk in banking. With high credit screening efficiency， banks will 
make few loans to firms with agency problem. With high credit supervision 
efficiency， the agency problem with high debt firms will be mitigated to protect 
creditor's benefits. 
To analysis the mechanism of creditor governance efficiency in China， this 
dissertation analyses the relation among the maturity structure of debt， investment 
behavior and controlling shareholder expropriation using a simultaneous equations 
model to solve the problem of the endogenesis of the companies' investment and 
financing behavior. By controlling the substitution effect（or the complement effect）
between overinvestment and controlling shareholders' expropriation， this dissertation 
also discusses the reason behind the systematic risk in banking markets and the listed 
companies’ agency problem which provides robustness analysis for this dissertation.  
This dissertation is divided into seven parts as follows: 
Chapter one briefly introduces the issues，  content，  framework of this 
dissertation as well as its contribution and innovation to research in this area. 
Chapter two introduces the literature review on investment behavior in respect of 
financial constraint， the first agency problem and the second agency problem. With 
an aim of providing a theoretical background for the empirical study， this chapter 
also discusses the relationship among the maturity structure of debt， investment 
behavior and controlling shareholders' expropriation. 















Chinese listed companies. Firstly， this chapter introduces the three stages of the 
development of Chinese investment mechanism. Second， it discusses the impact of 
government intervention and financial reform on investment behavior of Chinese 
companies. At last， it introduces the status quo of Chinese listed companies’ 
investment behavior which provides a realistic background for the empirical study. 
Chapter four makes use of a simultaneous equations model to analyze the impact 
of the stock rights nature and structure on debt financing， expropriation and 
investment behavior from the view point of internal governance with a data set of 
A-share listed firms over the period of 2001-2006. 
Chapter five makes use of a simultaneous equations model to analyze the impact 
of external governance mechanism on debt financing， expropriation and investment 
behavior. It also takes into account the inter-effect between external and internal 
governance mechanism to discuss the reason behind the systematic risk in banking 
markets and the listed companies’ agency problem. 
Chapter six takes into account the intereffect of internal and external governance 
mechanism to discuss the impact of the maturity structure of debt， expropriation and 
investment behavior on corporate value using the fix effect model. It provides not 
only an empirical supplement to chapter four and chapter five， but also provides 
strong support to the prior chapters. 
Chapter seven summarizes the empirical results and draws conclusions and 
points out the limitations of this article as well as future areas of the research. 
The main conclusions of this dissertation are as follows: 
（1）There is a negative effect of the scale of debt financing， investment and 
expropriation on corporate value ， which implies debt financing induces 
overinvestment and expropriation in Chinese listed companies. 
（2）With respect to internal governance mechanism， the stock rights nature and 
structure are important factors to determine creditor governance efficiency. On one 
hand， the state-owned listed companies with overinvestment problem are more likely 
to access to long term debt which induces a new round of overinvestment， but the 
private listed companies are not involved in the same problem. On the other hand， 
the listed companies with greater divergence between control rights and cash flow 















firms with no separation of control rights with cash flow rights don’t have the same 
agency problem. 
（3）With respect to external governance mechanism， creditor governance 
efficiency is under the impact of government intervention. The listed companies with 
higher degree of government intervention and problems of overinvestment and 
expropriation are more likely to access to long term debt and pursue private benefits 
of control which decrease corporate value. 
（4）There is an intereffect of external and internal governance mechanisms. In 
the region where the degree of government intervention is higher， the efficiency of 
long-term credit is higher in private listed companies than in state-owned listed 
companies. With a decrease in government intervention， there is an enhancement in 
the efficiency of long term credit， but some listed companies still make use of short 
term debt to pursue overinvestment and expropriation in turn. 
（5）With a decrease in government intervention， credit concentration becomes 
notable. Creditor governance tends to be ineffective for big business. The listed firms 
with low finanice constraint and great divergence between control rights and cash 
flow rights are more likely to make use of long term debt to overinvest， which 
decreases corporate value and enhances the potential risk of creditor. 
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